Stronger Patent Regime, Innovation and Scientist Mobility

Madhuparna Ganguly

Research in Economics, 2024, vol. 78, issue 4

Abstract: This paper analyzes the effects of a stronger patent regime on innovation incentives, patenting propensity and scientist mobility when an innovating firm can partially recover its damage due to scientist movement from the infringing rival. The strength of the patent system, which is a function of litigation success probability and damage recovery proportion, stipulates expected indemnification. We show that stronger patents fail to reduce the likelihood of infringement and further, decrease the innovation’s expected profitability. Higher potential reparation also reduces the scientist’s expected return on R&D knowledge, entailing greater R&D investment. Our results suggest important considerations for patent reforms.

Keywords: Damage rules; Infringement; Patent strength; Scientist mobility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J60 K40 L13 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reecon:v:78:y:2024:i:4:s1090944324000681

DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2024.101004

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