Resource allocation among multiple targets for a defender-attacker game with false targets consideration

Xiaoxiong Zhang, Song Ding, Bingfeng Ge, Boyuan Xia and Witold Pedrycz

Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 2021, vol. 211, issue C

Abstract: Appropriate resource allocation among multiple targets plays a vital role in the defender-attacker game. Traditional methods seldom consider the optimal resource allocation with more than one strategy among multiple targets. Accordingly, we assume that the defender moves first, allocating resources in deploying different false targets and strengthening the genuine ones among multiple targets. The attacker moves after observing the defender's move, distributing resources in identifying false targets and then attacking the genuine ones concerning multiple targets. Each player aims to maximize their own overall expected utility given any of the other player's move. The optimal resource distribution between target intelligence/protection for the defender and target identification/attack efforts among multiple targets for the attacker is studied. We model and obtain analytical equilibrium results under various parameter settings. Our results show that increased intelligence (impact) contest intensities lead to lower (higher) attacker resources in intelligence (attack). Moreover, the zero-sum game where both players share the same preferences without additional payoff consideration results in the worst losses for the defender. The forgoing method offers an original way to approach the resource allocation problems in security defense fields.

Keywords: Resource allocation; False targets; Game theory; Intelligence contest; Impact contest (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reensy:v:211:y:2021:i:c:s0951832021001617

DOI: 10.1016/j.ress.2021.107617

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