Does the winner take it all? Federal policies and political extremism

Gianmarco Daniele, Amedeo Piolatto and Willem Sas

Regional Science and Urban Economics, 2024, vol. 105, issue C

Abstract: Whether citizens like or dislike federal policies often depends on regional differences. Because of geography, (economic) history or other path-dependent factors, certain regions are perceived to get more out of the union than others. We show that citizens, therefore, have a strategic incentive to elect Federal delegates that are more extreme than the representative voter. The intensity of such strategic delegation is U-shaped in expected benefits. The predictions of our model hence rationalise the voting differences we observe in the data between national and EU elections.

Keywords: Federalism; Strategic delegation; Political extremism; Populism; European elections; Euroscepticism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H11 H7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:regeco:v:105:y:2024:i:c:s0166046224000103

DOI: 10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2024.103986

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