Application of an incentive for bus drivers to achieve an improvement in the quality of service

Alejandra Chaparro, Patricia Galilea, Juan Carlos Muñoz and Joaquín Poblete

Research in Transportation Economics, 2020, vol. 83, issue C

Abstract: Concession contracts of operating companies of the public transport system of Santiago, consider important fines if companies fail to comply with the operating plan, regularity and other operational variables included in those contracts. On the other hand, drivers receive a fixed payment with no pecuniary incentive related with their performance.

Keywords: Multitasking; Incentives; Contracts schemes; Bus drivers; Public transport systems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D24 D86 R49 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1016/j.retrec.2020.100908

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