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Does the strength of the legal systems matter for trade in insurance and financial services?

Azmat Gani and Michael D. Clemes

Research in International Business and Finance, 2016, vol. 36, issue C, 511-519

Abstract: This paper investigates if the strength of the legal system impacts on the trade in insurance and financial services in the high-income OECD and developing countries. Our findings reveal a statistically significant positive correlation of rule of law and regulatory quality with the exports and imports of insurance and financial services. Our empirical findings also reveal a negative and statistically significant correlation of contract enforcement with the exports and imports of insurance and financial services. We conclude that strengthening the rule of law and contract enforcement mechanisms can facilitate higher levels of trade in insurance and financial services.

Keywords: Rule of law; Contract enforcement; Regulations; Trade; Insurance; Finance; Services (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F14 G2 K2 O5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:riibaf:v:36:y:2016:i:c:p:511-519

DOI: 10.1016/j.ribaf.2015.10.008

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