Does central bank governors term in office matter for macroprudential policies? Evidence from MENA banks

Saibal Ghosh

Research in International Business and Finance, 2017, vol. 40, issue C, 34-51

Abstract: Using a comprehensive dataset on MENA banks, we examine whether CB governors use of macroprudential instruments affect bank risk. The findings indicate that the CB governors’ use of such instruments does not significantly reduce bank risk. We propose two hypotheses as to why CB governor are inclined to employ such instruments. Based on the findings, it appears that the decision to use such instruments is dictated more by macroeconomic considerations as opposed to peer pressure concerns.

Keywords: Macroprudential; Central bank governor; Peer pressure; Entrenchment; Banking; MENA (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E58 G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:riibaf:v:40:y:2017:i:c:p:34-51

DOI: 10.1016/j.ribaf.2016.12.004

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