Determinants and consequences of tournament incentives: A survey of the literature in accounting and finance
Sophia Li Sun and
Ahsan Habib
Research in International Business and Finance, 2020, vol. 54, issue C
Abstract:
This paper synthesizes the theoretical underpinnings of tournament models, reviews the extant empirical literature on the determinants and consequences of tournament incentives, critiques the findings and offers suggestions for future research. We synthesize findings from 63 empirical papers and find that several firm-level fundamental and corporate governance variables affect the structure of corporate tournaments. Our review of the consequences of tournament structure reveals that tournaments affect financial reporting and auditing as well as firm-level operational and capital market-based outcomes. This review reveals that the existing accounting and finance literature lacks a strong justification for why one theory rather than another is favored. Moreover, based on potential problems that may exist in empirical models, this review also offers some methodological implications for empirical tournament studies.
Keywords: Tournament incentives; Incentive compensation; Corporate governance; Financial reporting; Capital markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0275531919311638
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:riibaf:v:54:y:2020:i:c:s0275531919311638
DOI: 10.1016/j.ribaf.2020.101256
Access Statistics for this article
Research in International Business and Finance is currently edited by T. Lagoarde Segot
More articles in Research in International Business and Finance from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu (repec@elsevier.com).