Voluntary cooperation for mitigating collective-risk under spatial externalities
Yohei Mitani and
Naoya Yukizaki
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), 2024, vol. 109, issue C
Abstract:
Promoting public cooperation has become a challenge for authorities in the pandemic era. We develop a novel risk mitigation game laboratory experiment that explores the coordination and voluntary cooperation problems under spatial risk externalities, where the effect of an agent's effort depends on the spatially weighted efforts of all local and global members. We show that tax-like centralized interventions are effective in improving collective-risk mitigation, social welfare, and equality among members. Then, our result illustrates that the effectiveness of revealing information about others’ behavior on risk mitigation depends on intervention degrees and whether mitigation choices are strategic complements or substitutes.
Keywords: Spatial risk externality; Collective-risk mitigation; Cooperation; Laboratory experiment; COVID-19; Information provision (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D81 H41 I18 Q50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceco:v:109:y:2024:i:c:s2214804324000028
DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2024.102162
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