Group composition and conditional cooperation
Alexander Smith
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), 2011, vol. 40, issue 5, 616-622
Abstract:
This paper examines how group composition affects conditional cooperation in public good games. Identity was created using a team-building activity and subjects were assigned to groups of six with varying proportions of subjects from two teams. Majority members contributed more to the public good than minority members. However, contributions were mainly related to beliefs about the contributions of others, especially others from the same teams, rather than minority/majority status.
Keywords: Public good game; Group composition; Conditional cooperation; Identity; Reciprocity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1053535711000497
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceco:v:40:y:2011:i:5:p:616-622
DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2011.04.018
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics) is currently edited by Pablo Brañas Garza
More articles in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics) from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu (repec@elsevier.com).