Uncertainty resolution in tax experiments: Why waiting for an audit increases compliance

Stephan Muehlbacher, Luigi Mittone, Barbara Kastlunger and Erich Kirchler

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), 2012, vol. 41, issue 3, 289-291

Abstract: Tax compliance in a between-subjects experiment was higher when the uncertainty about the occurrence of an audit was not resolved until three weeks after participants had filed their tax returns than in a control treatment with immediate uncertainty resolution. Results have important implications for experimental tax research where providing immediate feedback whether participants are audited is common practice.

Keywords: Tax compliance; Tax experiments; Audits; Uncertainty resolution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 D84 D90 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceco:v:41:y:2012:i:3:p:289-291

DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2012.01.006

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