 Averting adverse selection: The Government of India's scheme to distribute affordable medicinesS. Srivatsa Srinivas and Rahul R. Marathe Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, 2021, vol. 78, issue C Abstract: An analysis of Pradhan Mantri Bhartiya Janaushadhi Parijoyana, a Government of India scheme which aims to provide quality generic medicines at affordable prices, is performed using a stylized model. There is distrust on the quality of generic medicines provided by the government and the government is taking enough measures to counter this perception. However, this distrust ensures that adverse selection is avoided wherein the poor patients become the scheme's beneficiaries and the wealthy patients don't intend to get generic medicines from this scheme. Hence, it is rational for the government to expend limited effort in creating awareness on the high quality of generic medicines so as to screen the wealthy patients from the poor patients. However, the government should exert maximum effort possible in ensuring the availability of generic medicines so that the search cost is minimized. It is surprisingly found that the government's effort required to screen the wealthy patients from the poor patients decreases with the availability of generic medicines. Keywords: Health policy; Adverse selection; India (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceps:v:78:y:2021:i:c:s0038012121000276 DOI: 10.1016/j.seps.2021.101035 Access Statistics for this article Socio-Economic Planning Sciences is currently edited by Barnett R. Parker More articles in Socio-Economic Planning Sciences from Elsevier |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.