Political electoral cycles and evolution of Italian health care system financing. A long run perspective

Fabio Fiorillo and Stefano Lucarelli

Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, 2024, vol. 94, issue C

Abstract: A notable feature of the Italian healthcare system – where funding is centralized and regions manage services locally – is the mismatch between expenditure and funding dynamics, leading to a structural deficit and frequent bailouts on the part the regions. To explain the actions of central and regional governments, we propose a strategic game. The nature of the game varies depending on whether we are in an electoral period for the renewal of the regional government. During elections, regional incumbents use their information advantages, and it is rational for them to increase the deficit, whereas for the central government, it is rational to reduce transfers.

Keywords: Electoral cycles; Public expenditure; Healthcare system; Italian economy; Regional incumbents (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C23 H51 H75 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceps:v:94:y:2024:i:c:s0038012124001265

DOI: 10.1016/j.seps.2024.101927

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