Optimal contracts under competition when uncertainty from adverse selection and moral hazard are present

N. Packham

Statistics & Probability Letters, 2018, vol. 137, issue C, 99-104

Abstract: In a continuous-time setting where a risk-averse agent controls the drift of an output process driven by a Brownian motion, optimal contracts are linear in the terminal output; this result is well-known in a setting with moral hazard and – under stronger assumptions – adverse selection. We show that this result continues to hold when in addition reservation utilities are type-dependent. This type of problem occurs in the study of optimal compensation problems involving competing principals.

Keywords: Principal–agent modeling; Contract design; Stochastic process; Stochastic control (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167715218300166
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:stapro:v:137:y:2018:i:c:p:99-104

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/supportfaq.cws_home/regional
https://shop.elsevie ... _01_ooc_1&version=01

DOI: 10.1016/j.spl.2018.01.014

Access Statistics for this article

Statistics & Probability Letters is currently edited by Somnath Datta and Hira L. Koul

More articles in Statistics & Probability Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().