For the sustainable performance of the carbon reduction labeling policies under an evolutionary game simulation

Rui Zhao, Xiao Zhou, Jiaojie Han and Chengliang Liu

Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 2016, vol. 112, issue C, 262-274

Abstract: The study proposes an evolutionary game model to investigate the possible responses of enterprises to incentive policies related to the implementation of a carbon reduction labeling scheme, such as a direct subsidy and preferential taxation rates. System dynamics is applied to simulate the created game model and we analyze two scenarios, namely the individual and combined intervention of incentive policies. A case study of China's air conditioner enterprises is then examined, with the simulation results highlighting that both a direct subsidy and preferential taxation positively influence the implementation of the carbon reduction labeling scheme. In particular, the combination of these two incentive policies is efficient compared with individual policy making. Finally, the limitations of the game theoretical analysis are discussed and future research directions are provided.

Keywords: Game theory; Evolutionary game; System dynamics; Carbon reduction labeling scheme; Incentive policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (38)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:tefoso:v:112:y:2016:i:c:p:262-274

DOI: 10.1016/j.techfore.2016.03.008

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