 Pricing network elements when costs are changingDavid Mandy () Telecommunications Policy, vol. 26, issue 1-2, 53-67 Abstract: This paper compares the pricing rule embodied in the Federal Communications Commissions (FCCs) forward-looking cost model with a competitive equilibrium pricing rule. The rules differ due to differences in discount factors, the time path of operating cost recoveries, and the methods used to spread capital costs over time. A calibrated comparison of the rules for end-office switching reveals that the latter is most significant, causing the FCCs rule to understate cost recoveries by 24 percent. A rough aggregation suggests this difference compounds to billions of dollars nationwide, solely for the direct costs of end-office switching. This understatement is driven by falling switch costs over time, and the FCCs rule would overstate cost recoveries by a similar magnitude for assets whose costs rise over time. The competitive equilibrium rule also clarifies the endogeneity of economic life and reveals that depreciation assumptions are not needed for calculating competitive equilibrium prices. Keywords: Pricing; Telecommunications; Deregulation (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:telpol:v:26:y::i:1-2:p:53-67 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Telecommunications Policy is currently edited by Erik Bohlin More articles in Telecommunications Policy from Elsevier |
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