The theory of access pricing and its linkage with investment incentives

Tommaso Valletti

Telecommunications Policy, vol. 27, issue 10-11, 659-675

Abstract: The paper reviews how the question of access pricing has been fully investigated by the theoretical literature in a static context. On the other hand, there is no developed analysis of the linkage between access pricing and incentives to invest. This paper argues that some useful literature in related areas can be brought to bear on the issue of "races" to build infrastructures, on the relationship between infrastructure and service competition, and on two-way network competition.

Keywords: Network; competition; Interconnection; Investments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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