Illegal parking and optimal enforcement policies with search friction

Mehdi Nourinejad, Amir Gandomi and Matthew J. Roorda

Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 2020, vol. 141, issue C

Abstract: Illegal parking adversely impacts traffic and creates unsafe conditions for other road users. We present parking enforcement policies to maximize social welfare and profit. We use the bilateral meet function to quantify the friction and characterize key factors of illegal parking behavior. The model shows that the citation probability increases with the violator dwell time but decreases with the violators arrival rate, and drivers are inclined to park illegally when their dwell time is short. We also present a counter-intuitive finding that the citation fine may increase the dwell time of the violators.

Keywords: Parking; Enforcement; Bilateral meeting; Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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DOI: 10.1016/j.tre.2020.102026

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