Quantity decision timing with spillover effect and asymmetric demand information

Musen Xue, Jianxiong Zhang and Guowei Zhu

Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 2020, vol. 142, issue C

Abstract: This study investigates how the spillover effect of retail service investment affects timing preference of quantity decision in a dual-channel supply chain under asymmetric demand information. The manufacturer-quantity-leader game and retailer-quantity-leader game are considered. Applying a signaling game-theoretic approach, we show that, for the chain members, whether to occupy the quantity decision leadership or not is conditional on the spillover intensity and the demand information value. We also identify certain conditions where the chain members can achieve a consensus on the quantity decision timing.

Keywords: Quantity decision timing; Asymmetric information; Spillover effect; Signaling game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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DOI: 10.1016/j.tre.2020.102048

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