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Pricing strategies of a dual-channel supply chain with risk aversion

Mengqi Liu, Erbao Cao and Coulibaly Kigbajah Salifou

Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 2016, vol. 90, issue C, 108-120

Abstract: We investigated the effect of risk aversion on the optimal policies of a dual-channel supply chain under complete information and asymmetric information cases. We determined that the optimal value added only depends on the value-added cost. The optimal prices under a risk-averse case are lower than those in a risk-neutral case. Information asymmetry increases wholesale and retail prices but reduces direct sale price, and tends to engender inefficiency. The value of information increases with the mean of the manufacturer’s estimation about the retailer’s risk aversion.

Keywords: Asymmetric information; Dual channel; Game theory; Risk averse; Supply chain (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (49)

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DOI: 10.1016/j.tre.2015.11.007

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