Clientelism, corruption and the rule of law

Staffan I. Lindberg, Maria Lo Bue and Kunal Sen

World Development, 2022, vol. 158, issue C

Abstract: It is widely believed that clientelism-the giving of material goods in return for electoral support-is associated with poorer governance outcomes. However, systematic cross-country evidence on the deleterious effects of clientelism on governance outcmes is lacking. In this paper we examine the relationship between political clientelism, corruption and rule of law using cross-country panel data for 134 countries for the period 1900–2018. We distinguish between two manifestations of political clientelism-whether vote buying exists, and whether political parties offer material goods to their constituents in exchange for political support (non-programmatic party linkages). We provide evidence of a negative relationship existing between political clientelism on governance outcomes, with increases in clientelism leading to increased political corruption, and weaker rule of law. We also find that the deleterious effects of political clientelism are mainly through non-programmatic party linkages rather than the practice of vote buying.

Keywords: Political clientelism; Development; Governance; Corruption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H40 N40 O10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:158:y:2022:i:c:s0305750x22001796

DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2022.105989

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