What's in a Second Opinion? Shadowing the ECB and the Bank of England

Matthias Neuenkirch and Pierre L. Siklos

CAMA Working Papers from Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University

Abstract: One way of evaluating how well monetary authorities perform is to provide the public with a regular and independent second opinion. The European Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank of England (BoE) are shadowed by professional and academic economists who provide a separate policy rate recommendation in advance of the central bank announcement. In this paper, we systematically evaluate this second opinion and find that, first, the shadow committee of the ECB tends to be relatively less inflation averse than the ECB. In contrast, the shadow committee of the BoE proposes a more hawkish monetary policy stance than the BoE. Second, consensus within a shadow committee is far easier to reach when there is no pressure to change the policy rate. Third, the ECB’s shadow committee is more activist than the ECB’s Governing Council and a larger degree of consensus within the former brings about a greater likelihood that the two committees will agree.

Keywords: Committee Behavior; Monetary Policy Committees; Shadow Councils; Taylor Rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E43 E52 E58 E61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2013-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-cdm, nep-mac and nep-mon
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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https://cama.crawford.anu.edu.au/files/publication ... euenkirch_siklos.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: What's in a second opinion? Shadowing the ECB and the Bank of England (2013)
Working Paper: What’s in a Second Opinion? Shadowing the ECB and the Bank of England (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:een:camaaa:2013-46

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