Price Floors for Emissions Trading
Peter Wood and
Frank Jotzo
Environmental Economics Research Hub Research Reports from Environmental Economics Research Hub, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University
Abstract:
Price floors in greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes can have advantages for technological innovation, price volatility, and management of cost uncertainty, but implementation has pitfalls. We argue that the best mechanism for implementing a price floor is by way of firms paying an extra fee or tax. This has budgetary advantages and is more compatible with international permit trading than alternative approaches that dominate the academic and policy debate. The fee approach can also be used to implement more general hybrid approaches to emissions pricing.
Keywords: Price floor; price ceiling; carbon tax; emissions trading; carbon pricing; price and quantity controls; Waxman-Markey Bill. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene and nep-env
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
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Related works:
Journal Article: Price floors for emissions trading (2011) 
Working Paper: Price Floors for Emissions Trading (2009) 
Working Paper: Price Floors for Emissions Trading (2009) 
Working Paper: Price Floors for Emissions Trading (2009) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:een:eenhrr:0936
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