EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Response of Fishermen to Fishing Control Policies in Southern Songkhla Lake, Thailand: A Field Experiment

Kunlayanee Pornpinatepong (), Pathomwat Chantarasap, Jumtip Seneerattanaprayul, Wittawat Hemtanon and Papitchaya Saelim
Additional contact information
Kunlayanee Pornpinatepong: Department of Economics, Prince of Songkla University, Hat Yai, Songkhla
Pathomwat Chantarasap: Department of Economics, Prince of Songkla University, Hat Yai, Songkhla
Jumtip Seneerattanaprayul: Department of Economics, Prince of Songkla University, Hat Yai, Songkhla
Papitchaya Saelim: Department of Economics, Prince of Songkla University, Hat Yai, Songkhla

No rr2013021, EEPSEA Research Report from Economy and Environment Program for Southeast Asia (EEPSEA)

Abstract: Game theory was used to analyze the extraction behavior of fishermen around the Southern Sonkhla Lake in Southern Thailand. The field experiments were designed based on the concept of non-cooperative game theory for investigating fishermen’s behavior in response to four management policy options: external regulations with individual transferable quotas (ITQs) and with individual quotas (IQ), and co-management with ITQs and with IQ. The analysis examined fishermen’s responses under high and low fish stocks that arose due to seasonal salinity in the Lake. Higher fish stocks encouraged fishermen to increase their extraction. A co-management policy led to better results than imposed external regulation in terms of reducing extraction and ensuring resource sustainability. There were no significant differences between ‘with ITQ’ and ‘without ITQ’ in terms of reduction of extraction and sustainability of resource use. However, there were significantly less violation behaviors when ITQs were used rather than with IQ. The ITQs provided more flexibility for fishermen who wanted to increase their extraction while still following conservation guidelines. Therefore, implementation of ITQ is recommended but with appropriate penalties.

Keywords: game theory; Thailand (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-02, Revised 2013-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-exp and nep-sea
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.eepsea.org/pub/rr/2013-RR2_Kunlayanee.pdf First version, 2013 (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://www.eepsea.org/pub/rr/2013-RR2_Kunlayanee.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://www.eepsea.org/pub/rr/2013-RR2_Kunlayanee.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://eepsea.org/pub/rr/2013-RR2_Kunlayanee.pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eep:report:rr2013021

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in EEPSEA Research Report from Economy and Environment Program for Southeast Asia (EEPSEA)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Arief Anshory yusuf ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-31
Handle: RePEc:eep:report:rr2013021