Strong equilibrium implementation for a principal with heterogeneous agents

Alexey Savvateev ()

EERC Working Paper Series from EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS

Abstract: The author models the interaction between the “Center”, represented by inspectors, and free riders in local trains (“hares” in the Russian slang). In order to characterize the optimal deterring strategy of the Center, one must look into the nature the interaction among parties in this game. After accomplishing this task, the author considers a more general class of phenomena that are intimately related to the one just described. Such phenomena will be analyzed in the framework of a “Center-offenders” model (a special case of the “Crime and Punishment” problem). The appropriate solution concept may be called a “natural Stackelberg solution”.

JEL-codes: K14 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 46 pages
Date: 2003-04-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-law, nep-reg and nep-tra
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