Political economy of tariff unification: the case of Russia

Afontsev Serguey ()

EERC Working Paper Series from EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS

Abstract: When designing a trade policy reform, government of a transition country faces the problem of minimizing both trade distortions and losses in tariff revenues. One possible solution of this problem is tariff unification, which undermines stimuli for tariff evasion and thus saves budget revenues. We use Grossman-Helpman (1994) model of tariff formation extended for the case of asymmetric information to analyze a political economy basis of tariff unification in Russia (2000-2001) and prospects of further tariff unification during the WTO accession process.

Keywords: Russia; political economy; endogenous protection theory; tariff regulation; policy formation in transition economy; trade policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 F14 P26 P33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-10-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cis, nep-pol and nep-tra
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