Models of supply functions competition with application to the network auctions

Vasin Alexander () and Vasina Polina ()

EERC Working Paper Series from EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS

Abstract: This paper studies different auctions of supply functions in a local market and a simple network market of a homogeneous good with two nodes and a fixed transmission loss per unit of the good. We study problems of existence, uniqueness and computation of Nash equilibria for these models. We also obtain the estimate of Nash equilibria deviation from the Walrasian equilibrium for each variant. We consider the problem of optimal auction organization from the point of view of the social welfare maximization.

Keywords: Russia; supply function auction; Cournot; Vickrey; Russian electricity market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-03-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cis, nep-com, nep-net and nep-tra
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