Candidate location and endogenous valence

Alexei Zakharov

EERC Working Paper Series from EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS

Abstract: This paper analyzes the effect that the ability of candidates to increase their valence has on candidate location in the Downsian model of elections. I show that if the candidates can increase valence at a cost after they have selected policy, then the candidates will select different policy platforms in order to avoid spending too much on valence. I then consider the factors that determine the degree of divergence, the amount spent on valence, and the location of the indifferent voter.

Keywords: Russia; valence; policy divergence; candidate equilibrium; median voter (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-12-29
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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