Healthcare Choices, Information and Health Outcomes
Achyuta Adhvaryu (achyuta.adhvaryu@yale.edu) and
Anant Nyshadham
Additional contact information
Achyuta Adhvaryu: MEPH Health Policy and Administration, Yale University
Working Papers from Economic Growth Center, Yale University
Abstract:
Self-selection into healthcare options on the basis of severity likely biases estimates of the effects of healthcare choice on health outcomes. Using an instrumental variables strategy which exploits exogenous variation in the cost of formal-sector care, we show that using such care to treat acute sickness decreases the incidence of fever and malaria in young children in Tanzania. Compared to the instrumental variables estimates, ordinary least squares estimates significantly understate the effects of formal-sector healthcare use on health outcomes. Improved information and more timely treatment, rather than greater access to medicines, seem to be the primary mechanisms for this effect.
Keywords: healthcare; information; child health; Tanzania (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I10 I18 O10 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 60 pages
Date: 2011-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev and nep-hea
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http://www.econ.yale.edu/growth_pdf/cdp994.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: Healthcare Choices, Information and Health Outcomes (2011) 
Working Paper: Healthcare Choices, Information and Health Outcomes (2011) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:egc:wpaper:994
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