Judgementalism about normative decision theory

Johanna Thoma

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: Judgementalism is an interpretation of normative decision theory according to which preferences are all-things-considered judgements of relative desirability, and the only attitudes that rationally constrain choice. The defence of judgementalism we find in Richard Bradley’s Decision Theory with a Human Face (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017) relies on a kind of internalism about the requirements of rationality, according to which they supervene on an agent’s mental states, and in particular those she can reason from. I argue that even if we grant such internalism, attitudes other than preferences in the judgementalist sense rationally constrain choice. This ultimately supports a different interpretation of preference.

Keywords: decision theory; preference; rational requirements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2019-12-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe, nep-ore and nep-upt
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Published in Synthese, 11, December, 2019. ISSN: 0039-7857

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