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Future imperfect: behavioural economics and government paternalism

Julian Le Grand

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: Economists and others have used the results from behavioral economics to justify paternalistic government policies, aimed at changing an individual’s behavior in the present so as to improve that individual’s well-being in the future. Examples include the automatic enrollment in pension schemes and anti-smoking measures, such as banning smoking in public places or proposals for a smoking license. But these - and the economic analyses underlying them – have been challenged on the grounds that they arbitrarily privilege one set of preferences over another. The privileged preferences include those of an ‘inner rational agent’ and those of the future over the present. This paper addresses this criticism and puts forward two new conceptions of - and justifications for – these kinds of policy.

Keywords: behavioral economics; government paternalism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9 pages
Date: 2018-12-31
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe
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Published in Review of Behavioural Economics, 31, December, 2018, 5(3-4), pp. 281-290. ISSN: 2326-6198

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