Norms, enforcement, and tax evasion

Timothy Besley, Anders Ditlev Jensen and Torsten Persson

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: This paper studies individual and social motives in tax evasion. We build a simple dynamic model that incorporates these motives and their interaction. The social motives underpin the role of norms and is the source of the dynamics that we study. Our empirical analysis exploits the adoption in 1990 of a poll tax to fund local government in the UK, which led to widespread evasion. The evidence is consistent with the model's main predictions on the dynamics of evasion.

JEL-codes: C1 J1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2021-10-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dem, nep-iue, nep-pbe and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Review of Economics and Statistics, 15, October, 2021, pp. 1 - 28. ISSN: 0034-6535

Downloads: (external link)
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/111519/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Norms, Enforcement, and Tax Evasion (2023)
Working Paper: Norms, Enforcement, and Tax Evasion (2019)
Working Paper: Norms, Enforcement, and Tax Evasion (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:111519

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