Monetary solidarity in Europe: can divisive institutions become ‘moral opportunities’?

Waltraud Schelkle

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: How does the inherent norm of integration, notably to share risks among its members in good faith, become a self-sustaining practice? I address this question generally and for a critical case of a divisive institution, i.e. the evolution of sovereign bailout funding in the Euro Area since 2010. Community building between states is a potential outcome of solidaristic practices, reinforced by positive feedback processes. Inspired by Deborah Stone’s [Stone, D. A. (1999). Beyond moral hazard: Insurance as moral opportunity. Connecticut Insurance Law Journal, 6(1), 12–46] work on insurance, I demonstrate that there are social mechanisms at play that favour the secular expansion of risk sharing between states.

Keywords: crisis; Euro area; insurance; moral hazard; risk-sharing; solidarity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2022-02-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-hpe, nep-ias and nep-mac
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published in Review of Social Economy, 26, February, 2022, 81(1), pp. 84-104. ISSN: 1470-1162

Downloads: (external link)
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/113746/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:113746

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library LSE Library Portugal Street London, WC2A 2HD, U.K.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by LSERO Manager ().