On the recent philosophy of decision theory

Ivan Moscati

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: In the philosophy of economics, the last fifteen years have witnessed an intense discussion about the epistemological status of economic models of decision making and their theoretical components, such as the concept of preference. In this article I offer a selective review of this discussion and indicate the directions in which I believe it should evolve.

Keywords: behaviorism; choice; heuristics; mentalism; naturalism; Preference; scientific realism and antirealism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9 pages
Date: 2021-01-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-hpe and nep-upt
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Published in Journal of Economic Methodology, 2, January, 2021, 28(1), pp. 98 - 106. ISSN: 1350-178X

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:115039

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