The changing and growing roles of independent central banks now do require a reconsideration of their mandate

Charles Goodhart and Rosa Lastra

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: In this paper, we analyse why the changing and growing roles of independent Central Banks now do require a reconsideration of their mandate.

Keywords: accountability; central banking; financial stability; independence; monetary policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E50 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2024-11-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cba, nep-his, nep-mon, nep-pay, nep-pke and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Accounting, Economics and Law: A Convivium, 30, November, 2024, 14(4), pp. 457 - 472. ISSN: 2152-2820

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:118448

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