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Organizing data analytics

Ricardo Alonso and Odilon Câmara

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: We develop a theory of credible skepticism in organizations to explain the main tradeoffs in organizing data generation, analysis, and reporting. In our designer-agent-principal game, the designer selects the information privately observed by the agent who can misreport it at a cost, whereas the principal can audit the report. We study three organizational levers: tampering prevention, tampering detection, and the allocation of the experimental-design task. We show that motivating informative experimentation while discouraging misreporting are often conflicting organizational goals. To incentivize experimentation, the principal foregoes a flawless tampering detection/prevention system and separates the tasks of experimental design and analysis.

Keywords: strategic experimentation; Bayesian persuasion; tampering; organizational design; information technology; audit (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D80 D83 M10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2024-05-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-des, nep-exp, nep-ict and nep-mic
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Published in Management Science, 1, May, 2024, 70(5), pp. 3123 - 3143. ISSN: 0025-1909

Downloads: (external link)
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/120780/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Organizing Data Analytics (2024) Downloads
Working Paper: Organizing Data Analytics (2021) Downloads
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