On the logical structure of de Finetti's notion of event

Tommaso Flaminio, Lluis Godo and Hykel Hosni

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: This paper sheds new light on the subtle relation between probability and logic by (i) providing a logical development of Bruno de Finetti's conception of events and (ii) suggesting that the subjective nature of de Finetti's interpretation of probability emerges in a clearer form against such a logical background. By making explicit the epistemic structure which underlies what we call Choice-based probability we show that whilst all rational degrees of belief must be probabilities, the converse doesn't hold: some probability values don't represent decision-relevant quantifications of uncertainty.

Keywords: events; de Finetti's coherence criterion; informations frames; choice-based probability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C02 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe and nep-mic
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Published in Journal of Applied Logic, September, 2014, 12(3), pp. 279-301. ISSN: 1570-8683

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