Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and uncertain local monitoring

Francesco Nava and Michele Piccione

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: The paper discusses community enforcement in infinitely repeated, two-action games with local interaction and uncertain monitoring. Each player interacts with and observes only a fixed set of opponents, of whom he is privately informed. the main result shows that when beliefs about the monitoring structure have full support, efficiency can be sustained with sequential equilibria that are independent of the players' beliefs. Stronger results are obtained when only acyclic monitoring structures are allowed or players have unit discount rates. These equilibria satisfy numerous robustness properties.

JEL-codes: J1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 2012-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth, nep-hpe, nep-mic and nep-pbe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:54250

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