The political economy of rationing health care in England and the US: the ‘accidental logics’ of political settlements

Gwyn Bevan and Lawrence D. Brown

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: This article considers how the 'accidental logics' of political settlements for the English National Health Service (NHS) and the Medicare and Medicaid programmes in the United States have resulted in different institutional arrangements and different implicit social contracts for rationing, which we define to be the denial of health care that is beneficial but is deemed to be too costly. This article argues that rationing is designed into the English NHS and designed out of US Medicare; and compares rationing for the elderly in the United States and in England for acute care, care at the end of life, and chronic care.

JEL-codes: N0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-07-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-age, nep-hea, nep-ias and nep-pol
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Published in Health Economics, Policy and Law, 1, July, 2014, 9(03), pp. 273-294. ISSN: 1744-1331

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:57129

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