Motivating knowledge agents: can incentive pay overcome social distance?

Erlend Berg and R Manjula

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: This paper studies the interaction of incentive pay and social distance in the dissemination of information. We analyse theoretically as well as empirically the effect of incentive pay when agents have pro-social objectives, but also preferences over dealing with one social group relative to another. In a randomised field experiment undertaken across 151 villages in South India, local agents were hired to spread information about a public health insurance programme. Relative to at pay, incentive pay improves knowledge transmission to households that are socially distant from the agent, but not to households similar to the agent.

Keywords: public services; information constraints; incentive pay; social proximity; knowledge transmission (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: N0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 2013-03-29
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/58167/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Motivating Knowledge Agents: Can Incentive Pay Overcome Social Distance? (2019)
Working Paper: Motivating Knowledge Agents: Can Incentive Pay Overcome Social Distance? (2013)
Working Paper: Motivating Knowledge Agents: Can Incentive Pay Overcome Social Distance (2013)
Working Paper: Motivating Knowledge Agents: Can Incentive Pay Overcome Social Distance? (2013)
Working Paper: Motivating Knowledge Agents: Can Incentive Pay Overcome Social Distance? (2013)
Working Paper: Motivating Knowledge Agents: Can Incentive Pay Overcome Social Distance? (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:58167

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