On the value of persuasion by experts

Ricardo Alonso and Odilon Câmara

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: A sender can influence the behavior of a receiver by controlling the informativeness of a public signal. We show that the sender cannot benefit from becoming an expert, that is, from privately learning some information about the state. We then show that in some instances an uninformed sender is ex-ante strictly better off than an expert sender.

Keywords: information control; persuasion; experts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 6 pages
Date: 2014-06-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: On the value of persuasion by experts (2018)
Working Paper: On the value of persuasion by experts (2018)
Working Paper: On the Value of Persuasion by Experts (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:58677

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