The struggle to perform the political economy of creditworthiness: European Union governance of credit ratings through risk

Bartholomew Paudyn

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: Analysing the European Union's regulatory response in the wake of the credit and sovereign debt crises, this paper argues how its adoption of risk management as the core strategy for governing the credit ratings space may undermine European efforts to rebalance the growing asymmetry between private expertise and public democracy. While centralised oversight, enhanced transparency and restorative, technical intervention seem like sound regulatory initiatives, I problematise the methodologies, models and assumptions of sovereign ratings to show how the new ratings framework may actually impede the ability of the technocratic European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to redress the most egregious deficiencies of ratings. Drawing on the performativity of market relations, the paper argues how ESMA's supervisory conflicts undermine the EU's capacity to perform an alternative political economy of limits. Neither is it democratically sanctioned to interfere in the analytical substance of ratings nor should it distort the social facticity of creditworthiness by relying primarily on quantitative risk analysis, ESMA will be forced to either repoliticise the ratings process or promote the status quo, which diminishes fiscal sovereignty.

JEL-codes: J1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-rmg
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Published in Journal of Cultural Economy, 4, September, 2015, 8(6), pp. 655-672. ISSN: 1753-0350

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