Because I'm worth it: a lab-field experiment on the spillover effects of incentives in health

Paul Dolan and Matteo Galizzi

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: We conduct a controlled lab-field experiment to directly test the short-run spillover effects of one-off financial incentives in health. We consider how incentives affect effort in a physical activity task – and then how they spillover to subsequent eating behaviour. Compared to a control group, we find that low incentives increase effort and have little effect on eating behaviour. High incentives also induce more effort but lead to significantly more excess calories consumed. The key behavioural driver appears to be the level of satisfaction associated with the physical activity task, which ‘licensed’ highly paid subjects to indulge in more energy-dense food.

Keywords: Incentives in health; spillover effects; licensing; hidden costs of incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C93 D0 I10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 74 pages
Date: 2014-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-hea
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/60356/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Because I'm Worth It: A Lab-Field Experiment on the Spillover Effects of Incentives in Health (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:60356

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library LSE Library Portugal Street London, WC2A 2HD, U.K.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by LSERO Manager ().