The strategic dis/advantage of voting early

Eddie Dekel and Michele Piccione

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: Under sequential voting, voting late enables conditioning on which candidates are viable, while voting early can influence the field of candidates. But the latter effect can be harmful: shrinking the field increases not only the likelihood that future voters vote for one's favorite candidate, but also that they vote for an opponent. Specifically, if one's favorite candidate is significantly better than all others then early voting is disadvantageous and all equilibria are equivalent to simultaneous voting. Conversely, when some other candidate is almost as good then any Markov, symmetric, anonymous equilibrium involves sequential voting (and differs from simultaneous voting).

JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-mic and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, November, 2014, 6(4), pp. 162-179. ISSN: 1945-7669

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Strategic Dis/advantage of Voting Early (2014)
Working Paper: The Strategic Disadvantage of Voting Early (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:61288

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