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Distaste for centralization: evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in Switzerland

Sarah Flèche

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: Do people care about the degree of centralization? This paper examines the effects of local centralization reforms on individuals' well-being using a quasi-natural experiment in Switzerland. The results reveal that centralization has a causal negative impact on individuals' life satisfaction. Consistent with the concept of procedural utility, centralization reduces individuals' feeling of having political influence and interest in politics. In contrast, there are no impacts on individuals' satisfaction with local governments' performance. These findings shed new light on what people value in decentralized institutions.

Keywords: decentralization; life satisfaction; public spending; procedural utility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 H40 I31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2015-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hap and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/64999/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

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Working Paper: Distaste for Centralization: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment in Switzerland (2015) Downloads
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