Guarding the guardians

Bernardo Guimaraes and Kevin Sheedy

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: Good government requires some restraints on the powerful, but how can those be impose if there is no-one above them? This paper studies the equilibrium allocation of power and resources established by self-interested incumbents under the threat of rebellions from inside and outside the group in power. Commitment to uphold individuals' rights can only be achieved if power is not as concentrated as incumbents would like it to be, ex post. Power sharing endogenously enables incumbents to commit to otherwise time-inconsistent laws by ensuring more people receive rents under the status quo, and thus want to defend it.

Keywords: power sharing; property rights; time inconsistency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 H11 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-11-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Published in The Economic Journal, 1, November, 2017, 127(606), pp. 2441-2477. ISSN: 0013-0133

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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/65196/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Guarding the Guardians (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:65196

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