Revising claims and resisting ultimatums in bargaining problems
Johannes Spinnewijn and
Frans Spinnewyn
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library
Abstract:
We propose a simple mechanism which implements a unique solution to the bargaining problem with two players in subgame-perfect equilibrium. The mechanism incorporates two important features of negotiations; players can revise claims in an attempt to reach a compromise or pursue their claims in an ultimate take-it-or-leave-it offer. Players restrain their claims to avoid a weak bargaining position or their resistance to uncompromising behavior to acquire leadership. The Nash solution and the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution are implemented in the extreme cases when respectively no and all revisions are allowed.
Keywords: bargaining solutions; Nash program; ultimatums (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-pr~ and nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
Published in Review of Economic Design, June, 2015, 19(2), pp. 91-116. ISSN: 1434-4742
Downloads: (external link)
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/66197/ Open access version. (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Revising claims and resisting ultimatums in bargaining problems (2015)
Working Paper: Revising claims and resisting ultimatums in bargaining problems (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:66197
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library LSE Library Portugal Street London, WC2A 2HD, U.K.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by LSERO Manager (lseresearchonline@lse.ac.uk).