Team adaptation

Jordi Blanes I Vidal and Marc Möller ()

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: We model an organization as a team choosing between a status quo project and a potentially superior alternative. We show that the members’ concern for each other’s motivation leads to a lack of communication, resulting in a failure to adapt (i.e. the status quo is maintained even when evidence for the alternative’s superiority has been observed). Adaptation failures are particularly severe when production exhibits strong complementarities. Improving the organization’s aggregate information has the adverse effect of reducing communication. In the long run, the organization can become “locked-in” with the status quo, in that adaptation is impaired for every adoptable alternative.

Keywords: teams; organizations; communication; disclosure; adaptation; motivation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O32 O47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2016-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-ppm
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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/66439/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Team adaptation (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:66439

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