Contractual externalities and systemic risk

Emre Ozdenoren and Kathy Yuan

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: We study effort and risk-taking behaviour in an economy with a continuum of principal–agent pairs where each agent exerts costly hidden effort. Principals write contracts based on both absolute and relative performance evaluations (APE and RPE, respectively) to make individually optimal risk–return trade-offs but do not take into account their impact on endogenously determined aggregate variables. This results in contractual externalities when these aggregate variables are used as benchmarks in contracts. Contractual externalities have welfare changing effects when principals put too much weight on APE or RPE due to information frictions. Relative to the second best, if the expected productivity is high, risk-averse principals over-incentivize their own agents, triggering a rat race in effort exertion, resulting in over-investment in effort and excessive exposure to industry risks. The opposite occurs when the expected productivity is low, inducing pro-cyclical investment and risk-taking behaviours.

Keywords: Contractual externalities; relative and absolute performance contracts; procyclicaleffort exertion and risk taking; many principal-agent pairs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D86 G30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-10-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hrm, nep-mic and nep-rmg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Review of Economic Studies, 1, October, 2017, 84(4), pp. 1789 - 1817. ISSN: 0034-6527

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Related works:
Journal Article: Contractual Externalities and Systemic Risk (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:75998

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