Auctions with selective entry

Matthew Gentry, Tong Li and Jingfeng Lu

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: We consider auctions with entry based on a general analytical framework we call the Arbitrarily Selective (AS) model. We characterize symmetric equilibrium in a broad class of standard auctions within this framework, in the process extending the classic revenue equivalence results of Myerson (1981), Riley and Samuelson (1981) and Levin and Smith (1994) to environments with endogenous and arbitrarily selective entry. We also explore the relationship between revenue maximization and efficiency, showing that a revenue maximizing seller will typically employ both higher-than-efficient reservation prices and higher-than-efficient entry fees.

JEL-codes: J1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-09-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 1, September, 2017, 105, pp. 104-111. ISSN: 0899-8256

Downloads: (external link)
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/83664/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Auctions with selective entry (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:83664

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library LSE Library Portugal Street London, WC2A 2HD, U.K.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by LSERO Manager ().