On dynamic consistency in ambiguous games

Andrew Ellis

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: I consider static, incomplete information games where players may not be ambiguity neutral. Every player is one of a finite set of types, and each knows her own type but not that of the other players. Ex ante, players differ only in their taste for outcomes. If every player is dynamically consistent with respect to her own information structure and respects Consequentialism, then players act as if expected utility for uncertainty about types.

Keywords: Ambiguity; incomplete information; dynamic consistency; strategic interaction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9 pages
Date: 2018-09-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 1, September, 2018, 111, pp. 241-249. ISSN: 0899-8256

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Related works:
Journal Article: On dynamic consistency in ambiguous games (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:89387

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